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Abstract
Behavioral biometrics, being non-intrusive and
cost-efficient, have the potential to assist user
identification and authentication. However, user
behaviors can vary significantly for different hardware,
software, and applications. Research of behavioral
biometrics is needed in the context of a specific
application. Moreover, it is hard to collect user data in
real world settings to assess how well behavioral
biometrics can discriminate users. This work aims to
improving authentication by behavioral biometrics
obtained for user groups. User data of a webmail
application are collected in a large-scale user
experiment conducted on Amazon Mechanical Turk.
Used in a continuous authentication scheme based on
user groups, off-line identity attribution and online
authentication analytic schemes are proposed to study
the applicability of application-specific behavioral
biometrics. Our results suggest that the useful user
group identity can be effectively inferred from users’
operational interaction with the email application.

1. Introduction
Companies are exposed to great risk of compromised
user accounts and insider attacks. In a recent global
study featuring 208 companies, 69% of enterprise
security professionals admitted having experienced
theft or corruption of company information at the hands
of trusted insiders [1]. Sharing credentials among
employees makes it more difficult for an IT system to
identify such attempts through authentication [2].
Conventional authentication scheme often does not
verify users’ authenticity continuously during active
sessions, leaving unattended computer systems
vulnerable to unauthorized use [3]. It has been widely
realized by the security community that traditional
identity and access management controls, which are
static and rigid, can no longer effectively protect
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valuable information assets once user account
credentials are compromised [4]. There is a higher risk
of abuse for mobile devices when they fall in wrong
hands.
Role-based access control (RBAC) regulates access
to enterprise system resources based on the roles of
individual users within an enterprise [5]. RBAC enables
users to carry out a wide range of authorized tasks by
dynamically managing their actions according to
functions, relationships, and constraints that can be
flexibly defined for user account groups [6]. This
contrasts with other methods of access control, which
grant or revoke user access on an object-by-object basis.
However, misconfiguration of RBAC systems, such as
orphaned accounts and shared accounts, exposes
enterprise assets to an increased level of risk of insider
attack who can steal data beyond a user’s access
privilege [7].
Biometrics-assisted authentication schemes help
with identity recognition by matching physiological or
behavioral traits to users who are be authenticated.
However, several issues exist with current biometricsbased authentication systems: (1) required special
hardware or software can be expensive and intrusive to
existing authentication processes, which causes privacy
and reliability issues; (2) a user’s identity stays
unverified beyond initial authentication, posing a risk as
described previously; (3) behavioral biometrics analysis
is isolated from specific application contexts,
information of which can likely contribute to the
effectiveness of biometrics-assisted authentication
solutions. It is of necessity to study behavioral
biometrics in a specific application context, i.e., taking
in consideration knowledge of its operations.
In this work, we propose a Context-Specific
Behavioral Biometrics Augmented Authentication
Scheme by assuming that inherent differences exist for
a special type of task among dissimilar groups (roles) of
users that can augment authentication and access
control. Application-specific behavioral biometrics
recognize patterns in high-level human computer
interaction under a specific application context [8], e.g.,
UI designs and system architecture. A behavioral user
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profile can be developed based on a user’s behavior that
is associated with the typical usage of one type of
application.
We explored the feasibility and applicability of using
application-specific behavioral biometrics by the
example of a common webmail application, instead of
application-independent behavioral biometrics, e.g.,
voice, eye movement, keystrokes and scrolling or
clicking activities. We customized logging functionality
on top of existing web event-listening mechanisms of
the webmail application and saved behavioral logs of
specific user operations. We extracted interpretable
context-specific features from such behavioral log data,
which were used for group-based authentication. The
labelling of user groups was derived from clustering
these behavioral biometric features. We investigated a
set of classifiers for offline identify attribution to infer
the user group of each user from behavioral log data and
applied a sliding window approach to support
continuous online authentication. Evaluation results
suggest that the introduced behavioral biometrics can be
applied to effectively classifying users’ group identities
in authentication during an active web session.
We aimed to make three-fold contributions in this
research effort. First, we extended the concept of
behavioral biometrics to incorporate the consideration
of a specific application or system and designed a
scheme of augmenting authentication utilizing such
behavioral biometrics. Second, we proposed and
examined offline identity attribution by mining user log
data and online authentication to recognize user
behavior patterns continuously. Third, we evaluated our
methods through k-fold cross-validation for accuracy to
test their feasibility.

2. Background
The challenge of identity recognition and
verification for authentication in information systems is
essentially the tradeoff between security of such a
scheme and its overall cost and usability. While physical
biometrics are mostly stored as credentials on the server
or locally at the risk of being stolen, user behavioral
profiles used for authentication usually possess no value
to attackers [9]. Moreover, physical biometrics leaves
more room for spoofing attempts. Therefore, behavioral
biometric systems recently have been explored
extensively in addition to physical biometrics.

2.1. Continuous authentication
Furnell et al. [10] found that users have a reasonable
expectation of continuous or periodical authentication
throughout their daily use of an IT system that tried to

maintain confidence in identity management. Both
physical biometrics and behavior indicators were
investigated and received positive feedback from users.
Location-based access control [11] and behavioral
biometrics, notably keystroke dynamics and mouse
movement [12-14] can provide common forms of
implicit authentication. More recently, accelerometers
and other sensors in mobile devices have been used to
profile and identify users. Chang et al. [15] used
accelerometers in television remote controls to identify
individuals. Kale et al. [16] and Gafurov et al. [17] used
gait recognition to detect whether a device is being used
by its actual owner. These biometrics and locationbased approaches are relevant to our work to
demonstrate the potential applicability of behavioral
biometrics to authentication.
The convergence of multiple biometric indicators of
identity is another current development that combines
multiple biometric factors to support an authentication
decision [18, 19]. For example, Greenstadt and Beale
[20] formulated a concept of “cognitive security” for
personal devices. Specifically, they proposed a multimodal approach “in which many different low-fidelity
streams of biometric information are combined to
produce an ongoing positive recognition of a user.”
These works have enriched the knowledge body of
behavioral biometrics. Though they did not specifically
touch on how behavioral biometrics can be further
formulated under certain software or hardware context.

2.2. Keystroke dynamics
Users interact with a computer through I/O devices
in specific ways. Patterns associated to individual users
can be recognizable in scenarios where there is a
repetition of interactions, such as typing one’s
credentials on a regular basis. Keystroke dynamics
refers to a mechanism of recording one’s behavioral
biometrics in during typing, which provides an
accessible manner for individual user authentication and
identification [21]. Investigated features for keystroke
dynamics vary from simple metrics of key press interval
and dwelling times, e.g., the up-up time, up-down time,
and down-down time, to multi-key features, e.g., bigraph and trigraph [22].
Classification methods have been researched
extensively to use these features in making
authentication decisions, including initial and
continuous authentication. Less researched keystroke
features include overall typing speed, frequency of
errors (i.e., use of backspace), use of the numpad, the
order in which a user presses the shift key for capital
letters, and possibly the force with which keys are hit
using special keyboards [23]. Keystroke dynamics aims
to model user typing patterns independent of the
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application context to suit computer systems that
involve the use of keyboard. Studies mostly ignore how
the contextual information of different applications
influences such behavioral biometrics.

2.3. Mouse movement
Mouse dynamics, as a behavioral biometric for
analyzing behavior data from pointing devices, e.g.,
mouse or touchpad, can aid authentication in an
accessible and convenient manner. Hashia et al. [24] and
Bours et al. [25] presented preliminary results on using
mouse dynamics for user authentication. They both
asked participants to perform fixed sequences of mouse
operations and analyzed behavioral characteristics of
mouse movement to identify a user during the login
stage. Distance-based classifiers were established to
compare the validation data with the enrollment data.
Hashia et al. collected data from 15 participants using
one computer, while Bours et al. collected data from 28
participants using different computers; they achieved
equal-error rates (EERs) of 15% and 28% respectively.
Aksari et al. [26] presented an authentication framework
for verifying users based on a fixed sequence of mouse
movement. Features were extracted from nine
movements among seven squares displayed
consecutively on a computer screen. They built a
classifier based on a scaled Euclidean distance using
data from both legitimate users and impostors. The
researchers reported to achieve an EER of 5.9% over 10
users collected from on the same computer. GUI design
and different computer platforms can have a significant
impact on user mouse movement. One-size-fit-all
behavioral biometrics should be examined in different
meaningful application contexts.

applications, which makes research findings specific to
intended applications.

3.1. Behavior data collection
Existing literatures often give out just a few details
about the instrumentation used to collect user behavioral
data and most studies hosted human subject experiments
in a highly controlled lab environment [20, 22, 24-26].
There have been successful examples of employing
participants remotely, e.g., using the Amazon
Mechanical Turk human subject pool, to perform
research-focused tasks [29-31]. Specifically, Bartneck
et al. [29] showed that recruiting such participants is
efficient and affordable for certain types of user tasks.
In our case, we hosted the user study experiment on
Amazon Mechanical Turk and recruited participants of
differing backgrounds from over twenty US states. We
instructed them to classify 40 emails into two categories,
i.e., legitimate and phishing, within a given amount of
time
on
Roundcube,
a
webmail
system
(http://www.roundcube.net].

3. Research design
Our work is based on an empirical user study that
collected user operations of fine granularity using a
modified web application [27, 28]. This user study
instructed participants recruited online to sort 40 emails
using a webmail system. Each email was classified as
either legitimate or phishing. The main goal was to
enable these participants to interact unbiasedly with a
web-based application and to capture realistic user
behaviors in doing so. Email sorting embodies one of
the most typical computer applications. It is viable if not
ideal to establishing the validity of the proposed
authentication
scheme.
Such
context-specific
behavioral biometrics are based on one applicable
platform among many other possibilities. The nature of
user operations is expected to vary for different

Figure 1. Data collection and continuous
authentication framework overview
The Roundcube webmail application is implemented
via HTML, JavaScript and PHP. The primary way to
interact with the application is through mouse hovering
over and clicking on buttons, links, email address, etc.
on a web browser. We embedded special JavaScript
code in HTML files dynamically generated by
Roundcube to capture users’ interaction with the
system, including mouse hovering and clicking as two
primary event types. We utilized AJAX to send captured
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user behavior information remotely to a logging service
running on the Roundcube server. Each participant had
a separate log file generated on the server, recording all
the operations throughout his/her active session using
the webmail application.
As shown in Figure 1, extracted behavioral features
from the log data can be used to develop a classifier of
the user group identify for authentication purposes. A
user is initially authenticated using stored credentials,
e.g., a password, and associated with a user group, e.g.,
system administrators or regular users. During online
authentication, sub-samples of in-session log data are
sent continuously to the classifier in real time that
updates the prediction of the group identity for a current
user. Alarms will be triggered or challenges issued to
this user if a mismatched group identity is suspected.

3.2. Overview of the data
We conducted the user experiment with 205 human
subjects recruited from the Amazon Mechanical Turk,
ending up with 177 users completing all the experiment
phases and only 146 participants completely sorting all
the 40 emails. There was data loss due to issues of the
server, network transmission, and the client end.
Furthermore, these participants were assigned to four
conditions determined by the presence of a secondary
question-answering tasks and/or a monetary incentive.
After a careful examination of log files, we selected the
data for 35 participants that were in coherent condition.

Figure 2. Data collection description
Figure 2 provides a brief description of the data
collected of user interactions with the emails. We
defined the behavioral log format based on the HTTP
common log format, which includes five fields of server
timestamp, client timestamp, user identifier, action
event, and action object. Clicking and hovering, two
essential ways of interacting with the webmail
application, can be further classified as hovering in and
hovering out and clicking on application buttons and
email related information, such as sender address, links
and attachment.

Demographic information was collected for each of
the participants, including age, gender, education level,
language background, education of cyber awareness,
etc. An ANOVA test was conducted to determine if
there was any significant difference among different
demographic groups in terms of the biometric features
listed later in Section 3.3. The tests result suggested
demographic groups showed no correlation with these
features.

3.3. Exacting features
The features extraction stage characterizes a user’s
behavioral biometric information. Unlike traditional
behavioral biometric systems, the proposed applicationspecific scheme extracted user behavioral features that
directly interpretable within the context of the
Roundcube webmail application. Four features were
developed to represent distinctive behavioral
characteristics of users based on available web interface
APIs that capture email processing operations.
1) Processing Time is defined as the time taken by
each participant from the moment they open an
email to the moment they assign a rating of
confidence level of classifying the email.
2) Reaction Time is defined as the time taken by each
participant from the moment they assign a rating of
confidence level to the moment they classify the
email into one category.
3) Phishing Tells Checking Bit is a binary value to
indicate whether the participant has checked an
email is coming from a legitimate source, i.e.,
hovering over the sender’s address.
4) Rating is defined as the confidence level assigned
by participants of how strongly they believe the
email falls into the chosen category of legitimate or
phishing. A participant was mandated to give a
confidence rating to each email before the email
was moved into the classified category. This value
ranges from 1 to 10, with 10 to denote the highest
confidence.
These four independent features were extracted and
each feature was represented by a numerical variable.
All these values can be derived from the log file for each
user and each instance of email processing. In this
manner, unstructured textual log files were converted
into vectorized features.

3.4. Offline identity attribution and online
authentication
Our approach combines classical unsupervised and
supervised machine learning algorithms to instrument
offline identity attribution and online authentication.
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Attribution is defined as the assignment of a user’s
behavior to a group identity. We differentiate offline
attribution and online classification based on not merely
different feature sets but also their purposes of
identification
and
authentication
respectively.
Identification involves user profiling to generate distinct
user classes or groups based on their distinguishable
characteristics, while authentication is the verification
of claimed identification.
In offline identity attribution, the entire log file
generated by each user is used to evaluate the group that
this user belongs to. It combines all the features in email
processing, i.e., 4 features by 40 emails. Therefore,
group identity attribution is based on complete user data
to profile user behavioral patterns. More specifically,
the group identity of each user was derived through
unsupervised clustering.
The online authentication scheme works in a way
that an alert is triggered when a user’s real-time
behavioral biometric features deviate drastically from
the supposed group identity, e.g., being associated to the
user through initial authentication using a password.
This scheme presents a viable approach of continuous
authentication with minimal computational cost and
response time. A sliding window approach was used to
feed a classifier features in the most recent segment of
processing emails during user interactions.

3.5. Summary of the analysis methodology
The multi-stage analysis is illustrated in Figure 4.
The pre-processing stage vectorizes log data in predefined format to extract the features as defined. We
first tried out three clustering algorithms to determine a
plausible number of user groups based on their
distinctive behavioral patterns. We then assigned the
group labels derived from clustering results to each user.
After that we employed a set of classification algorithms
to go through training and testing in both offline and
online modes.

Figure 3. A sliding email window where
training and testing instances are created
by shifting a window frame over
processed emails (l=3, r=1; l=4, r=2)
As shown in Figure 3, a window frame contains a
certain number of emails, defined as the window length
l. This data processing window moves over the emails
being processed in time order to create multiple
instances of vectorized behavioral biometric features in
the active session of a user. Each vector instance
consists of the 4 features averaged over the number of
emails in the current window frame. The other
parameter of this sliding window approach, the shift r,
is the number of emails being replaced for each frame.
In our scheme, the sliding window cannot be designed
using a fixed time interval. Moreover, the window
length l is an indicator of how soon this continuous
authentication scheme can detect irregularities in real
implementation.

Figure 4. Training and testing stages for
identity attribution and online
authentication
In online authentication, if consecutive email
window frames of emails processed by a user generate
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a classification different from the originally associated
user group, it would be compelling evidence that the
current user might not be the claimed user.

4. Clustering, training, and testing
4.1. Dimensionality reduction
We conducted statistical analysis to determine the
effect that each feature had on the unsupervised
clustering results. Specifically, we performed an
exploratory principal component analysis (PCA) of all
the features of the users, to remove redundant features
as the first step before clustering and classification to
extract most useful components. The PCA algorithm
automatically compares the number of data points and
the number of features in determining the resulting
components.

always give consistent number of clusters, i.e., it was
more susceptible to finding different local optima each
time the algorithm was run. Therefore, it looks that the
best clustering algorithm for the dataset is k-Means.
Specifically, as shown in Figure 6, 21 out of 35
participants were found belonging to one cluster, and 14
out of 35 belonging to the other.

Figure 6. Identity attribution clustering result
In further evaluation, we considered the two cluster
labels potentially reflect two group identities in the
original dataset and conducted in-sample validation
after PCA. However, it is hard to interpret exactly what
would these group identities translate into. A probable
explanation would be some users are more security
conscious as they perform the email sorting tasks with
relatively more time invested, and better email sorting
performance achieved. However, it is hard to find proof
due to the lack of knowledge of the participant users.
The optimum number of clusters was evaluated only
using the Silhouette Coefficient metric. Details about
evaluation metrics will be addressed in Section 5.

Figure 5. Dimensionality reduction by PCA
As in Figure 5, we arrived at this number by plotting
the percentage of variance captured by the kth
component. By examining the plots, we determined that
85% of the resulting components capture nearly 100%
of the variance. For the group consisting of 35 data
points, 29 components are kept. So, the data was
whitened to remove correlated variables.

4.2. Clustering and initial labeling
Users of similar behavioral patterns are allocated
into clusters using three clustering algorithms, i.e., kmeans, hierarchical (agglomerative), and mean shift, on
the feature vectors.
Mean Shift clustering grouped most points into a
single cluster, with some points as their own clusters.
Both k-means and hierarchical clustering gave out 2
almost identical clusters. Hierarchical clustering did not

4.3. Data generation for online authentication
Differences between legitimate and phishing emails
could affect user behavior of email processing when
implementing our email window approach for online
authentication. On the one hand, training using binary
email classification as features does not encode enough
information to do good classification predictions. On the
other hand, it is inherently unrealistic to know the nature
of each email in real world and to control the order in
which the emails are coming. As the result, we took a
sliding window over emails listed in the randomized
order that these 40 emails came for these participants.
And we assumed that if the window size is large enough,
we should be able to capture adequate information to
smooth out effect of mixed normal and phishing emails.
In one window frame, the email processing features are
averaged over the contained emails, which results in a
data point. Another advantage of this method is that this
approach generates significantly more data points for
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training purposes compared to using the entire log file
for a user as one data point. This can thus help to build
better classifiers. The chosen sliding email window
influences the key parameters in classifier algorithms,
which will be reported in Section 5.
After creating the sliding email window dataset, we
assigned cluster labels to the resulting dataset. Each data
point in the email window dataset will inherit the label
of the user it belongs to.

4.4. Classification and evaluation
We now have 2 datasets with corresponding group
labels for supervised learning or classification. We did
classification using 7 different classifiers. The method
for testing accuracy is k-fold cross validation, where k =
3 for offline identity attribution and k = 5 for online
authentication using the sliding email window dataset.
The final accuracy for each classifier is calculated by
averaging the k-fold accuracy results. The 7 classifiers
we have used are:
1) K-Nearest Neighbors
2) Logistic Regression
3) Support Vector Machine
4) Linear Discriminant Analyses
5) Gaussian Naïve Bayes
6) Decision Tree
7) Random Forest

5. Result analysis
Extensive analysis was conducted to examine the
reliability and efficacy of the proposed approach. The
evaluation of group identity is essentially two-class
classification based on the clustering results. For offline
identity attribution, we compared the classification
performance before and after PCA. For continuous
online authentication, we examined the classification
performance of these classifiers with different
parameters.
We considered performance metrics of accuracy
(ACC), Area under Curve (AUC), as well as the time
delay. ACC measures how well a binary classification
test correctly identifies an observation and is defined as
the ratio of the number of correct classifications to the
testing sample size. AUC is defined as the area under a
Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) curve, which
is equivalent to the probability that the classifier will
rank a randomly chosen positive instance higher than a
randomly chosen negative instance [32]. For
convenience, the definition of true positive and false
positive here is based on the two clusters, not in the
original sense of legitimate users and intruders.

Specifically, in plotting and calculation, cluster label 0
represents the negative class while label 1 the positive.
We like to make a couple notes here. A
misclassification is classifying one user wrongly to a
different group. So, there is no need to further define
false positive and false negative. Therefore, essentially
every misclassification could result in a legitimate user
being unauthenticated, comparable to the effect of a
false alarm. The delay required by an online
authentication scheme is the amount of time to collect
and process sufficient behavioral data for a decision. In
our scenario, this overhead is impacted by the size of the
used email sliding window, which corresponds to time
relative to the number of email processing, instead of an
absolute time duration. The time spent in filling out the
data needed for an email window frame and the time
needed for executing the classifier together decide the
time overhead for online authentication.

5.1. Offline identity attribution
The training phase for identity attribution takes all
the data of all the users as input. For ACC comparison.
we applied seven classifiers both before and after a PCA
analysis and observed an improvement in accuracy as
shown in Figure 7. The PCA is used to filter out nondiscriminating features with less variance to contribute
to classification applications. Such variables therefore
can confuse the classifiers by having information that is
not relevant. PCA removes these variables and only
keeps valuable information, thus reducing noise and
improving classification models.

Figure 7. Before/after PCA performance
In evaluating the performance of offline identity
attribution, we used 3-fold cross validation for ACC.
The data set was divided into 3 subsets and the holdout
method is repeated 3 times. Each time, one of the three
subsets was used as the test set and the rest two subsets
are put together to form a training set. Then the average
ACC across all the three trials was calculated. Lastly,
we applied traditional validation by setting training and
testing data ratio to be 75:25 to calculate the AUC of
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classifiers only after PCA. As shown in Table 1,
decision tree and random forest present ACC of above
70% before PCA is applied. After PCA decision tree
achieving ACC and AUC of 74.7% and 87.5%,
respectively, proves to be the best classifier for identity
attribution. That means the model can correctly classify
the users of both classes with a probability of 74.7%
while it erroneously classifies the users with a
probability of approximately one fourth.
Table 1. Identity attribution performance
Classifier
K-Nearest
Neighbors
Logistic Regression
Support Vector
Machine
Linear Discriminant
Analysis
Gaussian Naïve
Bayes
Decision Tree
Random Forest

Before PCA
ACC
0.648

After PCA
ACC
AUC
0.701
0.679

0.66
0.634

0.721
0.676

0.775
0.667

0.659

0.659

0.417

0.699

0.717

0.75

0.703
0.7

0.747
0.712

0.875
0.75

5.2. Online authentication
We were more interested in the performance of this
approach for online authentication. For this, evaluation
was conducted over of the same 7 classifiers with
different sliding email window parameters, as shown in
Tables 2, 3, and 4. Overall, decision tree and random
forest are two classifiers with the best performance.
Table 2. Online authentication performance
with l=3, r=1
Classifier
K-Nearest Neighbors
Logistic Regression
Support Vector Machine
Linear Discriminant Analysis
Gaussian Naïve Bayes
Decision Tree
Random Forest

ACC
0.731
0.67
0.6
0.719
0.794
0.82
0.776

AUC
0.608
0.568
0.5
0.611
0.784
0.865
0.814

Table 3. Online authentication performance
with l=5, r=1
Classifier
K-Nearest Neighbors
Logistic Regression
Support Vector Machine
Linear Discriminant Analysis
Gaussian Naïve Bayes
Decision Tree
Random Forest

ACC
0.673
0.682
0.62
0.684
0.761
0.813
0.848

AUC
0.611
0.604
0.655
0.605
0.781
0.786
0.799

Table 4. Online authentication performance
with l=7, r=1
Classifier
K-Nearest Neighbors
Logistic Regression
Support Vector Machine
Linear Discriminant Analysis
Gaussian Naïve Bayes
Decision Tree
Random Forest

ACC
0.692
0.698
0.6
0.689
0.67
0.767
0.815

AUC
0.612
0.657
0.5
0.662
0.607
0.762
0.796

Since we had much more data points for online
authentication, we employed 5-fold cross validation for
ACC estimation. With the window size set at 5 and the
shift at 1, decision tree and random forest achieved an
ACC of over 81%. And the ACC of the random forest
classifier was up to 84.8%, being the best.
The random forest classifier slightly outperforms the
decision tree classifier in terms of ACC. This may be
due to that a weighted random forest classifier puts more
weight on the minority class, inflicting a heavier penalty
on misclassifying the minority class. Additionally, its
classification and “randomness” rules employ
bootstrapping of data and random feature selection [33].
This enables the random forest classifier to find
informative information in small subsets of the data.
Similarly, we set training and testing data ratio to
75:25 for AUC estimation. The AUC values range from
76.2% to 86.5% for the two best classifiers, i.e., decision
tree and random forest, in the three settings of sliding
window, again a promising performance.
These rates of misclassification are comparatively
higher than many biometrics systems reported. A
probable explanation is that our user study was
conducted in a highly uncontrolled manner and the
participants coming from varying backgrounds might
not present strong group identities in such behaviors.
On the other hand, comparing the results derived
from using different sliding email window parameters l
and r, there does not exist a clear pattern of how these
parameters impact the performance of classifiers.
Empirically we can determine the best parameters on a
chosen specific application platform, although we have
not fully examined them in a systematic manner. An
additional complicating factor is how the nature of
emails, phishing or legitimate, could impact the use of
sliding email window.
Different window sizes can exert an impact on the
best parameters for KNN, decision tree, and random
forest. Specially, for Random Forest, the number of
classification trees is the key parameter affecting its
performance, which performs the best among a series of
classifiers. For random forest, in order to get a better
performance in actual application scenario, the number
of trees should be more than the number of classes,
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which is the number of user groups, which is 2 in this
case. Different window sizes influence Random Forest
the number of trees needed. Table 5 shows the number
of trees needed decreases when the size of email
window grows. Although the number of trees declines
by one when the window size changes from three to five,
the average accuracy increases by 7.2% with the AUC
only declined by 1.5%.
Table 5. Classifier parameter and sliding email
window size, where KNN-K is the number of
neighbors; DT-D is the depth of the decision tree;
RF-N is the number of trees in the forest
Window Size
KNN-K
DT-D
RF-N
l=3
9
8
10
l=5
5
9
9
l=7
7
10
8

The number of trees also affects the training speed
and complexity: processing speed would slow down,
and complexity would escalate when the number of
trees is growing. The time spent in filling out the data
needed for the email window and the time needed for
executing classifier algorithms together decide the delay
for online authentication.

In an active authentication setting, a few challenges
and further considerations arise. First, our experiment
presents a relatively high misclassification rate, which
risks forcing legitimate users to respond to challenges
unnecessarily. Moreover, for the sliding email window
approach, the tradeoff between the amount of data
collect by an email window frame and the authentication
efficiency is delicate to balance. In addition, hosting our
user study experiment on a remote web platform may
introduce more variables that need to be put under
control. A limited scale of dataset and a choice of just
an application can raise concerns to its validity too.
Findings or challenges presented in this paper deserve a
continuing effort in this novel direction of studying
application context-specific behavioral biometrics.
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8. References
6. Conclusion and discussion
Behavioral biometrics deals with hardware
platforms, software environment, and applications.
Current authentication schemes based on physical or
behavioral biometrics tend to be independent of
different application contexts. They can be further
assisted by behavioral biometrics that take the
advantage of rich contextual information to a specific
application.
This work is among the very few that studied user
behaviors on web applications. We hosted our user
study experiment on Amazon Mechanical Turk,
remotely collected user behavioral data, extracted
features from real user interactions with emails, and
investigated a set of classifiers for offline group identify
attribution and online authentication. The study
demonstrated effectiveness of our methods measured by
ACC and AUC.
The preliminary result has shown that the proposed
authentication scheme is promising, although further
research is warranted for a real-world implementation.
Application-dependent user behavioral biometrics can
encode distinctive identity information that can be used
to assist and augment traditional authentication
schemes. The results should also incentivize future
studies aiming to detect insider attacks based on
application-specific behaviors.
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